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HEARING OFFICER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA BY

BEFORE A HEARING OFFICER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,
OF THE STATE BAR OF T

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State Bar filed a Complaint on April 19, 2004. Respondent filed an Answer on May 17, 2004. The State Bar filed a Motion to Strike Respondent's Answer which was denied by Order dated June 24, 2004. Respondent subsequently filed a Motion to Continue Hearing on the Merits and to Extend the Discovery deadlines which was denied by Order dated July 20, 2004 as being beyond the Hearing Officer's jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 57(i)1. The parties filed a Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Tender) and a Joint Memorandum in Support of Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Joint Memo) on July 23, 2004.

After reviewing the Tender and Joint Memo, by Order dated August 2, 2004, the hearing officers ordered the parties to submit evidence and/or an explanation regarding certain issues raised by those pleadings on or before

August 13, 2004. In response to that Order, the parties filed separate supplemental memoranda and exhibits which appeared to manifest a lack of agreement on some of the material points of the Tender and Joint Memo. The hearing officer therefore reset this matter for hearing on the merits by Order dated August 18, 2004.

On August 26, 2004, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration which was granted after a telephone oral argument held the same day. The hearing officer's August 27, 2004 Order granting that Joint Motion for Reconsideration vacated the rescheduled hearing and required Respondent to provide the State Bar with a duplicate copy of Kathleen Ashton's file (Count Two) and file a supplemental stipulation which confirmed that delivery and clarifies the status of the client files in Counts One, Three, Five and Six. The parties filed a Supplemental Stipulation on September 1, 2004 which dealt with all the files except Kathleen Ashton. The State Bar filed a Notice of Compliance with regard to that file on September 9, 2004.

No hearing has been held.

<u>FINDINGS OF FACT</u>

1. At all times relevant, Respondent was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona, having been admitted to practice in Arizona on October 24, 1996.

COUNT ONE (File No. 03-0310)

- 2. On or about January 30, 2002, Henryka Fila retained Respondent to represent her in a suit against the State of Arizona stemming from a governmental invasion into her home that resulted injury to Ms. Fila.
- 3. Respondent and Ms. Fila entered into a contingent fee agreement, and Ms. Fila provided Respondent with several documents pertaining to the case.
- 4. Thereafter, Respondent would not return Ms. Fila's phone calls, cancelled scheduled appointments, and ignored requests for information regarding the status of the case.
- 5. Ms. Fila requested the return of her documents and none was returned as of the date the Complaint was filed. Ms. Fila was ultimately able to provide a case file to her new counsel. Thus, for restitution purposes the parties stipulate that the location of this file is now moot.
- On February 14, 2003, Ms. Fila filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar of Arizona.
- 7. On March 10, 2003, the Attorney/Consumer Assistance Program ("A/CAP") Director sent the complaint to Respondent along with a letter directing him to contact Ms. Fila and to copy the State Bar on the correspondence.

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- 8. On March 24, 2003, Respondent sent Ms. Fila a letter, and copied the State Bar.
- 9. The A/CAP Director deemed the information submitted was insufficient cause to open a screening file and was therefore going to close the case.
- 10. Thereafter, Ms. Fila contacted an attorney to help her articulate her complaint to the State Bar and, on July 21, 2003, Ms. Fila submitted another letter of complaint with documentation to the State Bar.
- 11. On August 6, 2003, the A/CAP Director sent the additional complaint to Respondent along with a letter directing him to contact Ms. Fila, and to copy the State Bar on the correspondence. Respondent did not respond to this letter.
- 12. On September 18, 2003 the A/CAP Director sent Respondent another letter informing him of the complaint and requesting his response.

 Respondent did not respond to this letter.
- 13. Due to Respondent's failure to respond to the letters from A/CAP, this matter was referred to the Lawyer Regulation Department of the State Bar for screening and investigation.

- 14. On November 4, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent the initial screening letter and requested he submit a response to the charges contained therein. Respondent did not respond to this letter.
- 15. Respondent's conduct as described in this count violates Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and Rule 53 (d) and (f).

COUNT TWO (File No. 03-0703)

- 16. In or about July 2001, Kathleen Ashton ("Ms. Ashton") retained Respondent to assist her in some post-divorce matters.
- 17. At the time, Respondent was working for the Pruett Law Firm located in Sun City, Arizona.
 - 18. Ms. Ashton paid a \$2700.00 retainer fee.
- Thereafter, Ms. Ashton did not hear from Respondent for several weeks.
- 20. When Ms. Ashton attempted to contact the Pruett Law Firm to find out why she had not heard from Respondent, she discovered that Respondent was no longer working there.
- 21. Shortly thereafter, Respondent contacted Ms. Ashton and informed her that had left the Pruett Law Firm, but still had her case and would continue to represent her.

- 22. On February 7, 2002, Ms. Ashton sent Respondent a facsimile requesting that he get the hearing scheduled for February 13, 2002 postponed, as Ms. Ashton's mother was in the hospital in critical condition and Ms. Ashton did not want to leave her.
- 23. Respondent claims that he contacted the opposing party's attorney, Elizabeth Langford, who agreed to stipulate to a continuance of the hearing.
- 24. Respondent did not appear for the hearing scheduled for February 13, 2002.
- 25. The opposing party and counsel appeared for the hearing and informed the court that they had not stipulated to the requested continuance.
 - 26. The February 13, 2002 hearing was rescheduled for April 17, 2002.
 - 27. Ms. Ashton never received notice of the April 17, 2002 court date.
- 28. Respondent stated he was never personally notified of the April 17, 2002 court date, but admits that he knew the February 13, 2002 hearing had been reset.
- 29. When Respondent failed to appear for the April 17, 2002 hearing, the Court contacted Respondent at his office, and Respondent went to the hearing.
- 30. Ms. Ashton was at work at the time of the April 17, 2002 hearing and was unable to be contacted, resulting in her non-appearance.

- 31. Respondent appeared at the April 17, 2002 hearing without Ms. Ashton present and did not request a continuance.
- 32. On April 23, 2003, Respondent missed another scheduled court hearing.
- 33. At the April 23, 2003 hearing, the judge ordered Respondent to submit to the Court a written explanation as to why he failed to appear for the April 23rd hearing.
- 34. On May 27, 2003, Respondent missed another scheduled court hearing.
- 35. At the May 27, 2003 hearing, the judge issued an Order to Show Cause regarding Respondent's failure to appear at properly noticed hearings and for his failure to submit a written explanation to the Court as ordered on April 23, 2003.
- 36. On May 30, 2002 Ms. Ashton sent Respondent an email inquiring as to the status of the case. Respondent did not respond.
- 37. On June 17, 2002 Ms. Ashton sent Respondent an email requesting evidence of Respondent's work on the case. Respondent did not respond.
- 38. The hearing on Order to Show Cause proceeded on July 18, 2003. The Court found that Respondent did not willfully fail to comply with the Court's orders and quashed the Order to Show Cause; however, the Court warned

Respondent that, in the future, the Court would not accept his explanation that he did not receive minute entries as a reason for failure to comply with court orders.

- 39. Ms. Ashton left several messages with Respondent's receptionist requesting Respondent contact her. Respondent failed to return her calls.
- 40. Ms. Ashton scheduled telephone conference appointments with Respondent. When Ms. Ashton would call Respondent's office on the date and time of these appointments, Respondent would not be there.
- 41. On April 14. 2003 Ms. Ashton filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar.
- 42. Respondent's conduct as described in this count violates Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 8.4(d).

COUNT THREE (File No. 03-0871)

- 43. In or about September 2002, Bernadette Collar retained Respondent to represent her in a child custody matter.
 - 44. Ms. Collar paid Respondent a \$2800.00 retainer fee.
 - 45. Ms. Collar drafted all of the necessary court paperwork herself.
- 46. Respondent promised Ms. Collar an expedited court hearing, but this did not happen.
- 47. In December of 2002, the child custody matter went to court, and the case was dismissed to Ms. Collar's detriment.

- 48. Respondent failed to return any of Ms. Collar's telephone calls either before or after the court hearing.
- 49. Ms. Collar requested an accounting and refund of any unused portion of her retainer from Respondent. Neither has been forthcoming to date.
- 50. On May 7, 2003, Ms. Collar filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar.
- 51. On May 19, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the complaint with the initial screening letter, requesting Respondent submit a response to the allegations contained therein. Respondent failed to respond to this request.
- 52. On June 18, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a letter reminding him of his ethical duty to respond to requests for information from the State Bar, and again requested a response. Respondent failed to respond to this request.
- 53. On July 14, 2003, Respondent called Bar Counsel and requested an extension of time in which to submit his response. Bar Counsel granted a twenty-five (25) day extension until August 8, 2003. Respondent failed to submit his response within this extended timeframe.
- 54. On August 20, 2003, Bar Counsel's assistant telephoned Respondent's office to inquire as to the status of the response. Respondent

advised that he would submit the response by that Friday, August 22, 2003. Respondent failed to submit his response by that date.

- 55. On August 25, 2003, Respondent contacted the State Bar and stated that would submit his response by 5:00pm that day. Respondent failed to do this.
- 56. On August 27, 2003, Bar Counsel contacted Respondent at approximately 10:00am and advised him that, if he did not submit a response by 5:00pm that day, then his case would be treated as a non-response. Respondent still failed to submit a response.
- 57. Respondent's conduct as described in this count violates Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16(d), and Rule 53 (d) and (f).

COUNT FOUR (File No. 03-1350)

- 58. Janice and Russell Trueblood ("the Truebloods") retained Respondent to represent them in a personal injury matter against Home Depot.
- 59. Thereafter, Respondent failed to attend depositions, missed scheduled independent medical exams, and ignored written discovery requests.
- 60. Upon information and belief, the defense counsel wrote Respondent approximately twenty-four (24) letters and made several phone calls requesting overdue discovery responses, medical records, MRI films, expert opinions, wage loss documentations, joint submissions, etc.

- 61. Respondent did not respond to these efforts, forcing defense counsel to file four (4) motions to compel. Respondent did not comply with the resulting orders.
- 62. On July 17, 2003, the State Bar received a judicial referral regarding Respondent's conduct in the matter of *Trueblood v. Home Depot*.
- 63. On August 14, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the judicial referral and an initial screening letter requesting Respondent submit a response to the allegations contained therein. Respondent failed to respond.
- 64. On June 18, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a letter reminding him of his ethical duty to respond to requests for information from the State Bar of Arizona, and again requested a response. Respondent failed to respond to this request.
- 65. Respondent's conduct as described in the count violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.3, 3.2, 3.4(c), 8.4(d) and Rule 53(d) and (f).

COUNT FIVE (File No. 03-1445)

- 66. Amaechi Akpa retained Respondent to represent him in a criminal matter in federal court.
- 67. Following the termination of representation, Respondent failed to provide an accounting or turn over Mr. Akpa's file upon Mr. Akpa's request. Mr.

Akpa's new counsel was ultimately able to reconstitute the file from documents provided by Mr. Akpa, court records and the U.S. Attorney's Office.

- 68. On August 4, 2003 Mr. Akpa filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar of Arizona.
- 69. On September 4, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the complaint and an initial screening letter requesting Respondent submit a response to the allegations contained therein. Respondent failed to respond.
- 70. On September 8, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of additional correspondence received from Mr. Akpa and requested a response to the allegations contained therein. Respondent failed to respond.
- 71. Respondent's conduct as described in the count violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.16(d), and Rule 53(d) and (f).

COUNT SIX (File No. 03-1739)

- 72. On or about May 1, 2003 Robert and Beverly Leon ("the Leons") retained Respondent to represent them in a domestic relations matter.
- 73. On or about May 1, 2003, the Leons paid Respondent a \$2000.00 retainer fee.
- 74. Thereafter, Respondent failed to return phone calls, cancelled or did not show up for scheduled appointments, and told the Leons that their case had been filed and papers had been served when they had not.

75. Respondent did not perform any work on the Leons' case.

- 76. The Leons made multiple requests for the return of their file with the documents and pictures contained therein. Respondent has not provided the file to the Leons as of this date.
- 77. The Leons subsequently retained new counsel who satisfactorily concluded their case. Thus, the current status of Respondent's client file is moot for purposes of these proceedings.
- 78. On September 13, 2003, Respondent sent the Leons a letter and a refund check for \$2000.00.
- 79. On September 19, 2003, the Leons filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar.
- 80. On September 25, 2003, the Leons returned the \$2000.00 check to Respondent along with a letter stating Respondent had told them the refund was a, "donation for their problems."
 - 81. Respondent has since returned the \$2000.00 check to the Leons.
- 82. On October 9, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the complaint and an initial screening letter requesting Respondent submit a response to the allegations contained therein. Respondent failed to respond.
- 83. Respondent's conduct as described in the count violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and Rule 53(d) and (f).

- 83. Grace Lenore Anderson ("Ms. Anderson") paid Respondent \$2,500.00 to represent her in her divorce, child custody, and order of protection matters.
- 84. Ms. Anderson's ex-husband was ordered to pay Respondent \$1500.00 in attorney's fees.
- 85. Respondent informed Ms. Anderson that her ex-husband did not pay him, and demanded she pay him the \$1500.00 or he would withdraw from the representation.
 - 86. Ms. Anderson paid Respondent the \$1500.00.
- 87. Respondent did not communicate with Ms. Anderson regarding the status of the case, would not return her phone calls, missed the hearing regarding her order of protection, did not notify her of court hearings, did not file required paperwork, and misplaced documents from her file.
- 88. Ms. Anderson attempted to fire Respondent several times, but he refused to withdraw from the case,
- 89. Respondent refused to return Ms. Anderson's file or refund her retainer upon her request.
- 90. On July 22, 2003, Ms. Anderson filed a document with the Maricopa County Superior Court entitled, "Petition for Andrew Mankowski Re: Fireing

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24 25 (sic) and Withdraw from Divorce/Custody Case Number FC2001-010394 and Order to Show Cause Contemempt (sic) and Sancitions (sic)."

- On September 22, 2003, the State Bar received a minute entry dated 91. September 16, 2003 regarding Ms. Anderson's July 22, 2003 petition.
- In the September 16, 2003 minute entry, the court ordered Ms. 92. Anderson's petition to be forwarded to the State Bar, and further ordered Respondent to provide a written response to the petition to the court and to the State Bar no later than 45 days from the filing date of the minute entry.
- On October 8, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the 93. complaint and an initial screening letter requesting Respondent submit a response to the allegations contained therein. Respondent failed to respond, in violation of the court's order of September 16, 2003.
- On March 3, 2004, Bar Counsel advised Respondent that he was to 94. return Ms. Anderson's file to her by March 12, 2004. Respondent provided documentation that the file had been returned to Ms. Anderson on February 27, 2004.
- 95. Respondent's conduct as described in the count violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 and Rule 53 (c), (d) and (f).

COUNT EIGHT (File No. 03-1769)

- 96. On or about May 2003, Jodie Henderson ("Ms. Henderson") retained Respondent to represent her in a child custody matter.
 - 97. Ms. Henderson paid Respondent a \$1500.00 retainer fee.
- 98. Thereafter, Ms. Henderson tried to contact Respondent via telephone, email, and visits to his office.
- 99. Respondent failed to provide a substantive response to any of Ms. Henderson's efforts to contact him.
- 100. On or about July 8, 2003, Ms. Henderson fired Respondent and retained another attorney for \$1500.00.
- 101. Upon learning of his termination, Respondent contacted Ms. Henderson and asked to be permitted to continue with the case, stating that he was prepared for trial. Ms. Henderson did not trust Respondent, did not believe that he was ready for trial, and told Respondent she did not want him to continue with the representation.
 - 102. Respondent refunded \$1000.00 of Ms. Henderson's retainer.
- 103. Ms. Henderson's new attorney filed a motion to continue so she could have a reasonable amount of time to prepare for trial.
- 104. On July 11, 2003, Judge Roland Steinle granted the motion and set a hearing on September 5, 2003 to determine if Respondent or Ms. Henderson

 should be ordered to pay the opposing party's attorney fees and costs related the to continuance.

- 105. During the September 5, 2003 hearing on sanctions, Judge Steinle ordered Respondent to return to Ms. Henderson the remaining \$500.00 of her retainer, ordered Respondent to pay the opposing party's legal fees, and ordered the matter to be referred to the State Bar.
- 106. On September 24, 2003, the State Bar received a copy of the minute entry with exhibits from the September 5, 2003 hearing.
- 107. On October 8, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the complaint and an initial screening letter requesting Respondent submit a response to the allegations contained therein.
- 108. On October 23, 2003, the State Bar received a copy of the minute entry on Respondent's case dated July 11, 2003, and another copy of the September 5, 2003 minute entry from Judge Steinle.
- 109. On October 28, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the July 11, 2003 and September 5, 2003 minute entries along with a letter reminding him that his response is due November 3, 2003.
- 110. On December 2, 2003, Respondent sent Bar Counsel a letter advising Bar Counsel that an appeal of the monetary sanctions against him was pending and requested additional time to respond. It was later discovered that

although Respondent had filed a Notice of Appeal on November 19, 2003, he did nothing further in that matter.

- 111. On December 8, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a letter denying his request for an extension of time and advising him that, since he had previously failed to respond to this complaint within the allotted time frame, a request for an Order of Probable Cause had already been forwarded to the Probable Cause Panelist.
- 112. On March 1, an Order to Show Cause hearing was held concerning Respondent's failure to pay either his former client or opposing counsel. Based on Mr. Mankowski's representation that he had refunded Ms. Henderson's \$500.00 and would pay the fees of opposing counsel, Mr. Mankowski was not held in contempt.
- 113. Respondent's conduct as described in the count violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 and Rule 53 (c), (d) and (f).

COUNT NINE (File No. 04-0135)

- 114. In September of 2002, Shelly Sharp ("Ms. Sharp") retained Respondent to represent her in a domestic relations matter.
 - 115. Ms. Sharp paid Respondent a fee of \$1500.00.
- 116. Over the next few months, Respondent repeatedly failed to communicate with Ms. Sharp or keep appointments she made to meet with him.

- 117. Respondent failed to appear at hearing for a protective order and later told Ms. Sharp he had been with another client.
- 118. Respondent failed to have Ms. Sharp's ex-husband served with the order of protection when he stated he would.
- 119. Ms. Sharp terminated Respondent's services in November of 2002 due to the breakdown of communication with Respondent.
- 120. After requesting an accounting of the services performed in the matter, Respondent refunded \$500.00 to Ms. Sharp and stated, in a letter dated January 15, 2003, that a final bill would be forthcoming. A final accounting has not been forthcoming to date.
- 121. Ms. Sharp requested fee arbitration through the State Bar in August of 2003 but Respondent failed to respond to the State Bar's attempt to resolve the matter through arbitration.
- 122. On January 3, 2004, Ms. Sharp requested that her complaint against Respondent be re-opened due to his failure to participate in fee arbitration.
- 123. On January 29, 2004, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of Ms. Sharp's complaint with the initial screening letter, requesting that Respondent submit a response to the allegations. Respondent failed to respond to this request.

124. On May 21, 2004, an Order of Probable Cause was entered against Respondent for violations of ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1(b) and Rules 53(d) and (f). [EXHIBIT 1 to Tender]

125. Respondent's conduct as described in the count violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 8.1(b) and Rule 53(d) and (f).

COUNT TEN (File No. 04-0328)

- 126. Respondent represented George Soper in the Maricopa County Superior Court matter entitled *In Re the Marriage of George Soper and Nina Soper*, case number FN 2002-006868. Nina Soper was not represented by counsel.
- 127. Prior to August 26, 2003, the parties had reached a settlement agreement. As part of the agreement, Mr. Soper agreed to pay Mrs. Soper \$2,500.00 in cash for the sale of community property. Mrs. Soper agreed that Mr. Soper would repay the funds at the rate of seventy-five dollars (\$75.00) per month until paid in full. In addition, Mr. Soper agreed that Mrs. Soper was entitled to receive 20% of his retirement benefits.
- 128. On August 26, 2003, a hearing was held before the Honorable Cari Harrison. Respondent and Mr. Soper appeared in person while Mrs. Soper appeared telephonically.

129. At the hearing, Respondent questioned Mr. Soper, under oath, regarding the terms of the settlement agreement. Mr. Soper testified that Mrs. Soper would receive \$2,500.00 as repayment of a debt and the 20% of his retirement benefits.

- 130. On or about August 26, 2003, the court issued a minute entry ordering Respondent to file the proposed divorce decree by September 26, 2003.
- 131. According to Mrs. Soper, she attempted to contact Respondent numerous times throughout October and November concerning the status of the decree but Respondent failed to respond. Mrs. Soper sent a letter to Respondent regarding the fact that Respondent had not filed the divorce decree as ordered by the court.
- 132. Respondent filed the decree of dissolution with the court on December 29, 2003, more than three months past the date ordered by the court.
- 133. The decree submitted by Respondent stated that Mr. Soper would pay Mrs. Soper alimony in the sum of seventy-five dollars (\$75.00) per month for 33 and 1/3 months. This was contrary to the agreement of the parties.
- 134. The decree further stated that Mrs. Soper waived her rights to Mr. Soper's retirement benefits. Again, this was contrary to the agreement reached by the parties and testified to by Mr. Soper at the August 26th hearing.

135.	On	or	about	December	29,	2003,	the	court	signed	the	submitted
decree of dis	soli	ıtio	n								

- 136. On or about January 4, 2004, after receiving her copy of the decree, Mrs. Soper wrote to both Respondent and the court pointing out the errors in the decree. Respondent failed to respond or correct the errors.
- 137. On February 23, 2004, Mrs. Soper filed a complaint with the State Bar.
- 138. On March 5, 2004, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a copy of the complaint and an initial screening letter requesting Respondent submit a response to the allegations contained therein. Respondent failed to respond.
- 139. On July 9, 2004, the court issued a minute entry in the matter, ruling that Respondent's failure to correct the decree filed with the court violated Rule 11, Ariz. R. Civ. P., and sanctioned Respondent. [EXHIBIT 2 to Tender]
- 140. Respondent's conduct as described in the count violated Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 3.3(a)(1), 4.1, 4.4, 8.4(c) and (d) and Rule 53(c), (d) and (f).

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS COUNT ONE (File No. 03-0310)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits that his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional

Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and Rule 53 (d) and (f).

COUNT TWO (File No. 03-0703)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(b).

COUNT THREE (File No. 03-0871)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16(d), and Rule 53 (d) and (f).

COUNT FOUR (File No. 03-1350)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.3, 3.2, 3.4(c), 8.4(d) and Rule 53(d) and (f).

COUNT FIVE (File No. 03-1445)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional

Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., specifically, ERs 1.16(d), and Rule 53(d) and (f).

COUNT SIX (File No. 03-1739)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and Rule 53(d) and (f).

COUNT SEVEN (File No. 03-1767)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 and Rule 53 (c), (d) and (f).

COUNT EIGHT (File No. 03-1769)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct; Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 and Rule 53(d) and (f).

COUNT NINE (File No. 04-0135)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional

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Conduct: Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.16 and Rule 53(d) and

COUNT TEN (File No. 04-0328)

Respondent, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, conditionally admits his conduct violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 42, Ariz. R. S. Ct., ERs 3.3(a)(1), 4.1, 4.4, 8.4(c) and (d) and Rule 53(c), (d) and (f).

DISMISSED ALLEGATIONS

The State Bar, in exchange for the agreed upon form of discipline, agrees to dismiss the following violations:

> COUNT ONE: ER 1.1

> **COUNT SIX:** ER 1.5

COUNT NINE: ER 1.15 and 8.1(b)

ABA STANDARDS

The ABA Standards list the following factors to consider in imposing the appropriate sanction: (1) the duty violated, (2) the lawyer's mental state, (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and (4) the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. ABA Standard 3.0.

In determining the appropriate sanction, the parties considered both the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

("Standards") and Arizona case law. The Standards provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. The Court and Commission consider the Standards a suitable guideline. In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1990); In re Kaplan, 179 Ariz. 175, 177, 877 P.2d 274, 276 (1994).

Concerning the many violations involving scope of representation, diligence and communication, Standard 4.4 is applicable. Respondent repeatedly failed to communicate with his clients, failed to schedule and/or attend court hearings, and failed to diligently represent his clients. Standard 4.42 states that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, or a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

As to the various violations involving failure to expedite litigation, fairness to opposing party and respect for rights of a third person, Standard 6.2 is applicable. Standard 6.22 states that suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. In Count Four, Respondent failed to attend depositions, failed to inform his clients about scheduled independent medical exam appointments, and

ignored written discovery requests. Respondent's failure to expedite the litigation of his clients' cases, including his failure to comply with requests for discovery or communicate in any manner, forced opposing counsel to file four (4) Motions to Compel that were then granted by the court but ignored by Respondent.

Standard 4.6 is applicable to violations related to fees and misconduct involving dishonesty. Standard 4.62 states that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client. In Count Three, Respondent collected fees from the client but failed to perform any work on the case or return any of the fees. In Count Ten, Respondent filed a dissolution decree that misrepresented the agreement of the parties as testified to on the record. Further, when the matter was brought to his attention, Respondent did nothing to correct the misrepresentation and was subsequently sanctioned by the court for his conduct.

Throughout the course of the State Bar's investigation in this matter, Respondent consistently failed to respond to repeated requests for information concerning the allegations made by the Complainants. Standard 7.0 is applicable to these violations. Standard 7.2 states that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a

duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or legal system.

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Standard 6.0 is applicable to violations of duty to the legal system and relates Standard 6.1 specifically to false statements, fraud and misrepresentation. In this matter, Respondent failed to correct filed documents and failed to correct misstatements made to the Court and to opposing party, as set forth in Count Ten. Standard 6.12 states that suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

Based on the foregoing, the presumptive sanction for the admitted conduct is a term of suspension. After determining the presumptive sanction, it is appropriate to evaluate factors enumerated in the Standards that would justify an increase or decrease in the presumptive sanction.

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS

This Hearing Officer then considered aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, pursuant to *Standards* 9.22 and 9.32, respectively. This Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that four aggravating factors apply and should be

considered in this matter: (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency and (i) substantial experience in the practice of law. As is often the case, the final factor is offset by the corresponding factor of an unblemished disciplinary record during the same time period. *Matter of Shannon*, 179 Ariz. 52, 68, 876 P.2d 548, 564 (1994).

This Hearing Officer agrees with the parties that three factors are present in mitigation: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; and (c) personal or emotional problems. Although as noted, the absence of a prior disciplinary record is offset by the aggravating factor of substantial experience in the practice of law.

The evidence of personal or emotional problems was not extensive. See Matter of Augenstein, 178 Ariz. 133, 137-38, 871 P.2d 254, 258-59 (1994). However, the parties did present evidence that Respondent is a solo practitioner with a diverse practice. Respondent had too many clients and could not maintain support staff to assist him. Respondent's wife had been helping with the practice until she was diagnosed with cancer and could no longer assist Respondent. The departure of his wife from his practice appears to coincide with the rash of complaints the State Bar received.

Given the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, the presumptive sanction of suspension is appropriate.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases that are factually similar. *In re Shannon*, 179 Ariz. 52, 71, 876 P.2d 548, 567 (1994) (quoting *In re Wines*, 135, Ariz. 203, 207 (1983)). However, the discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. *Matter of Riley*, 142 Ariz. 604, 615 (1984). Where there are multiple acts of misconduct, the Respondent should receive one sanction consistent with the most serious instance of misconduct, and the other acts should be considered as aggravating factors. *In re Cassalia*, 173 Ariz. 372, 843 P.2d 654 (1992).

In the present case, the most serious duty violated was the duty Respondent owed to his clients. The following cases are instructive concerning this type of misconduct.

In In the Matter of Steven Blaine, 2002 Ariz. Lexis 81, Supreme Court No. SB-02-0071-D, the Disciplinary Commission suspended Blaine for a period of six months and one day for conduct in violation of Rule 42, specifically ERs 1.2,

 1.3, 1.4, 8.1(a), 8.4(d) and Rule 51 (h) and (i). As in this case, Blaine failed to consult with his client concerning the objectives of the representation, failed to abide by the client's decisions concerning the means by which the objectives should be accomplished, failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, failed to keep a client reasonable informed about the status of a matter, failed to promptly comply with reasonable request for information, and failed to explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. In addition, Blaine failed to respond to a demand for information from a disciplinary authority, failed to promptly furnish information or respond to an inquiry from bar counsel and refused to cooperate with officials and staff of the State Bar. Blaine's conduct was found to have been prejudicial to the administration of justice.

The Commission applied ABA Standards 4.0 and 7.0 and determined that suspension was the presumptive sanction for Blaine's conduct. In review of Standards 9.22 and 9.32, the Commission determined that there were three aggravating factors and two mitigating factors that should affect the sanction to be imposed. In aggravation, the Commission found prior disciplinary offenses, a

Amended as Supreme Court Rule 53 (f) and (d), respectively.

pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses. In mitigation, the Commission found absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and personal or emotional problems.

In the Matter of Naida Axford, 2000 Ariz. Lexis 104, Axford was suspended from the practice of law in the State of Arizona for six months and one day for conduct in violation of Rule 42 Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 3.1, 3.2, and 8.4(d).

The allegations against Axford arose out of four different matters. The Commission found that on multiple occasions, Axford failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing her clients, failed to keep the clients reasonably informed as to the status of their cases and charged an unreasonable fee. The Commission also found that Axford failed to explain the matter sufficiently to allow the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, took no action to protect the client or pursue the client's claim and failed to consult and abide by the client's decisions about the objectives of the representation. The Commission found three aggravating factors: pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law. Three factors were found in mitigation: absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and personal or emotional problems.

Similarly, In the Matter of Patricia A. Pelfrey, 1999 Ariz. Lexis 31, Supreme Court No. SB-98-0066-D, Pelfrey was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day for violations of ERs 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 3.3, 3.4, 8.1, 8.4 and Rule 51 (e) (h) (i) and (k). In aggravation the Commission found a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law, however the Commission felt that a discipline free history during the entire period negated the last aggravating factor. In mitigation the Commission found the absence of any dishonest or selfish motive and possible psychological or medical problems.

Finally, in In the Matter of Shaver, 2001 Ariz. Lexis 100, Supreme Court No. SB-01-0114-D, the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona censured Shaver for conduct in violation of ERs 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 and 1.16. The Commission found that, during his representation of clients in 6 different matters, Shaver violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to provide adequate attention to the files, failing to diligently pursue the matters, failing to communicate with the clients and failing to resolve fee disputes. The Commission found that Shaver's conduct was similar in each of the matters. The Commission found three aggravating factors: a pattern of misconduct, multiple

Amended as Supreme Court Rule 53.

offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law. In mitigation, the Commission found six factors: absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, personal problems, timely good faith effort to rectify consequences of misconduct, full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings and remorse. However, the State Bar would argue that, while similar, Shaver is distinguishable from this case in that there are more aggravating factors than in Shaver.

Respondent's conduct in the instant case and the ethical violations alleged are similar in nature to *Blaine*, *Pelfrey* and *Axford*, all of which resulted in suspensions of six (6) months and one (1) day. The sanction agreed upon by Respondent and the State Bar is within the range of appropriate sanctions for the admitted conduct. A lesser sanction is not appropriate given the nature of the misconduct. Respondent should be required to demonstrate rehabilitation in order to return to the practice of law. Otherwise, there is no way to ensure the protection of the public. Likewise, a more severe sanction than agreed upon would serve no purpose other than to punish.

RECOMMENDATION

The purpose of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter future misconduct. *In re Fioramonti*, 176 Ariz. 182, 187, 859 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1993). It is also the objective of lawyer discipline to protect the

public, the profession and the administration of justice. *In re Neville*, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985). Yet another purpose is to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity. *Matter of Horwitz*, 180 Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 361 (1994).

In imposing discipline, it is appropriate to consider the facts of the case, the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and the proportionality of discipline imposed in analogous cases.

Matter of Bowen, 178 Ariz. 283, 286, 872 P.2d 1235, 1238 (1994).

Upon consideration of the facts, application of the *Standards*, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and a proportionally analysis, this Hearing Officer recommends acceptance of the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent and the Joint Memorandum in Support of Agreement for Discipline by Consent providing for the following:

- 1. Respondent shall be suspended for six months and one day.
- 2. Upon reinstatement, Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of two years, commencing upon the signing by Respondent of a Probation Contract. The terms of probation shall be as follows:
- a. Respondent will, within thirty days of the Supreme Court's Order of Reinstatement, contact the director of the State Bar's Law Office Management Assistance Program (LOMAP) to schedule an audit of his law office. The

 LOMAP director or his/her designee will conduct an audit of Respondent's law office no later than thirty days thereafter. Following the audit, Respondent will enter into a Memorandum of Understanding that will be effective for a period of two years from the date upon which all parties sign the Memorandum. Respondent will comply with all recommendations of the LOMAP director or his/her designee.

- b. Respondent will, within thirty days of the Supreme Court's final judgment and order, contact the director of the State Bar's Membership Assistance Program (MAP) to schedule an assessment of his condition to practice law. The MAP director or his/her designee will schedule the assessment of Respondent to take place no later than sixty days thereafter.
- c. Respondent will be responsible for the costs and expenses associated with his participation in the MAP and LOMAP programs.
- d. Respondent shall be assigned a practice monitor for the period of probation. The reporting terms shall be developed by LOMAP and shall require that the practice monitor actively monitor Respondent's case load.
- e. Respondent shall participate in fee arbitration with the named Complainants in Counts Two, Three, Five, Seven, and Nine. Respondent will pay restitution to those Complainants as determined by the arbitrator. The Complainants have agreed to participate in fee arbitration. Respondent shall pay

f. In the event that Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing conditions, and the State Bar receives information, bar counsel shall file with the Hearing Officer a Notice of Non-Compliance, pursuant to Rule 60(a)5, Ariz. R. S. Ct. The Hearing Officer shall conduct a hearing within thirty days after receipt of said notice, to determine whether the terms of probation have been violated and if an additional sanction should be imposed. In the event there is an allegation that any of these terms have been violated, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove non-compliance by clear and convincing evidence.

3. Respondent shall pay the costs and expenses incurred in this disciplinary proceeding.

DATED this $10^{\frac{\gamma}{10}}$ day of September, 2004.

Jeffrey Messing

Hearing Officer 9X

Original filed with the Disciplinary Clerk this /b day of September, 2004.

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2	Copy of the foregoing was mailed this 10 th day of September, 2004, to:
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4	Andrew Mankowski Respondent
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6	Phoenix, AZ 85012-2407
7	Michael N. Harrison
8	Bar Counsel State Bar of Arizona
9	111 West Monroe, Suite 1800
10	Phoenix, AZ 85003-1742
11	by: Pata Williams
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